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Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA
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Tiana Mayere Lee*

SUMMARY

Enacted in 1986, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act ("EMTALA") requires hospitals to provide a medical screening
examination to all persons who present to an emergency department. While
it has been nearly two decades since EMTALA was enacted, the problems it
was meant to solve persist and continue to affect providers and the public.
Section I of this article provides a history of the statute. Section II provides
an in-depth explanation of the specifics of the statute and its accompanying
regulations. Section III details governmental enforcement efforts to date.
Section IV identifies the benefits and drawbacks of the statute. Section V
of the article provides recommendations for ameliorating EMTALA's
Finally, Section VI discusses several factors that may
weaknesses.
compromise the future effectiveness of EMTALA, including the costs of
enforcement and the re-ordering of federal administrative priorities in the
wake of September 11th. In order for EMTALA to serve its intended
purpose, Congress must grant providers appropriate financial relief so that
EMTALA compliance does not become an unfunded mandate. The
government must refine its procedures for holding providers accountable
for EMTALA violations, including narrowing the prosecutorial discretion
of the Office of the Inspector General, and updating federal information
systems so that tracking and enforcement are efficient.
I. A

HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL

TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR ACT

It is said that poverty's partners are public indignity and perennial
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danger-a truism manifested in modem American medical culture by the
practice of patient dumping. Patient dumping occurs when poor or
uninsured patients in need of emergency treatment are transferred from
hospital to hospital before they are medically stable, solely or primarily
because of their inability to afford medical services. The social and medical
harms of patient dumping have long been recognized. When patient
dumping first became common, states initially sought to forbid the practice
by recognizing and enforcing at common law an affirmative duty on the
part of public hospitals to provide emergency treatment to patients without
regard to ability to pay.2 In addition, courts often relied upon public policy
and custom to ensure that health care providers met this duty.3 However,
the common law duty proved ineffective, as indigent patients still
encountered substantial difficulty in obtaining health care. Consequently,
states sought to impose on hospitals a statutory duty to treat emergency
patients without regard for their ability to pay.4 However, this approach
also proved ineffective because there was often no clear definition of what
constituted an emergency, thus allowing providers to abdicate their
responsibility to provide care under the guise of confusion. Moreover,
many states did not enforce this requirement and there were few sanctions
5
imposed against providers that ignored this responsibility.
Because the states were largely unsuccessful in requiring hospitals to
provide emergency care to the poor, the federal government took action. In
1946, Congress enacted the Hill-Burton Act, which required hospitals, as a
condition of receiving federal funds for construction or modernization, to
treat and stabilize all emergency patients prior to discharge.6 However, the
1. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, In Bombay, Public Indignity Is Poverty's Partner,N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 1, at 3.

2. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961);
Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Mercy
Med. Ctr. of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 206 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Wis. 1973).
3. See, e.g., Mercy, 206 N.W.2d at 200 ("Our health conscious society and the
government's interest in extensive health care.., demands that emergency service... be
promptly rendered to those in need without regard for immediate payment or security
therefor.").
4. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1317(b) (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §447-260(E) (Law. Co-op. 2000); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1 (2002).

See also Thomas L.

Stricker, Jr., The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act: Denial of Emergency
Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1121, 1125
n. 16 (1992) (citing various state statutes designed to eliminate patient dumping).
5. See Karen I. Treiger, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA 's Fangs,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1202 (1986) (describing the ineffectiveness of the state response to
patient dumping).
6. Treiger, supra note 5, at 1198; 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2000) (providing that hospitals
built with federal funds must be part of a state plan to provide for "adequate hospitals.. . for
all persons residing in the State ...to furnish needed services for persons unable to pay
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Hill-Burton requirement proved to be yet another ineffective measure
against patient dumping-primarily for the reasons that states failed to
stanch the practice. First, the Department of Health and Human Services
7
("DHHS") failed to enforce the indigent patient care requirement. Second,
neither the Hill-Burton Act nor its regulations effectively defined
"emergency," thus allowing hospitals to disregard the requirement to
provide emergency services to all persons.8 Third, there were no punitive
remedies for violations of the statute. 9 Finally, though some courts
recognized an implied private right of action under Hill-Burton, most
0
patients remained unaware of their rights and remedies under the statute.'
While the federal government was considering what its next step would
be to ensure that all persons had equal access to emergency medical care,
the public grew increasingly concerned by vivid news media accounts of
severely ill or injured persons being denied emergency care. 11 For example,
one instance of patient dumping was reported in gruesome detail:
In one case a patient who had been on a mechanical breathing device for
5 days, and was comatose, was transferred without the knowledge or
consent of the county hospital. The patient had surgical incisions for
brain operations on both sides of the head with the brain bulging out of
one of the incisions. This patient had a fever of 103 and was paralyzed
on the left side of the body.
One group of patients particularly affected by patient dumping was
pregnant women, who often found it difficult to find a hospital that would
admit them in their time of need:
[T]he refusal of two private hospitals to treat a desperate, pregnant
woman who had no medical insurance resulted in the stillbirth of her
therefor."). See also Stricker, Jr., supra note 4, at 1125.
7. Treiger, supra note 5, at 1198.
8. Id. at 1199.
9. Id.at 1199-1200.
10. Id.at 1200.
131 CONG. REc. S13,892 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985). According to Senator
11.
Durenberger:
[T]he patient dumping issue . . . has gained much public attention over the last
The CBS News show '60 Minutes' ran a segment exposing the
year.
inappropriate transfer of a number of seriously ill patients from the emergency
rooms of private hospitals to public hospitals .... The Washington Post
[subsequently] chronicled a Dallas case of a badly burned laborer who was turned
away from a number of hospitals before he could get the treatment he badly
needed.
12. 131 CONG. REC. E5520 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) (statement of Rep. Stark) (citing
multiple media reports of patient dumping).
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baby. Even though she was in severe pain when she showed up at the
first hospital, the hospital turned her away without letting her even see a
doctor. At the second hospital a fetal monitor had detected irregularities
in the baby's heart and a doctor at the hospital thought the baby's
irregular heartbeat was a sign of fetal distress. Incredible as it may seem,
she was told to go to the county hospital for care. By the time she arrived
at the third hospital, the baby's heartbeat was barely detectable.
Although the county hospital rushed to perform a Ceasarean [sic] section,
the baby was stillborn. 13
As the public became more aware of cases like these, elected
representatives gave voice to the growing sense of outrage. Representative
Fortney "Pete" Stark deemed the problem of patient dumping "a growing
problem with tragic results." 14 Senator David Durenberger stated that "[a]ll
Americans, rich or poor, deserve access to quality health care. This
question of access should be the government's responsibility at the federal,
state, and local levels." 15 The inequity of medical treatment calibrated by
socioeconomic circumstance was summed up by Congressman Stark, who
stated that "[t]hese cases are medically indefensible. They are ethically
indefensible. Clearly, if these patients had been middle class with health
insurance they never would have faced the horrors that they encountered." 16
When Congress began to direct its attention to the issue of patient
dumping with an eye toward legislation to prohibit the practice (eventually
enacted as EMTALA), hospital administrators reacted strongly. They
denied the need for any new requirements because they claimed existing
policies and procedures adequately ensured fair access to medical
facilities.17 However, these protestations were belied by the results of
several studies showing that patient dumping was indeed an ongoing and
serious problem. The Himmelstein research team conducted one of the
earliest studies of patient dumping. The study examined 458 patient
transfers to a public hospital from private hospitals during a six-month
period. 18 The study found that 97% of the patients who were transferred to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
131 CONG. REC. S13,892.
131 CONG. REC. E5520.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR

GEN. (OIG), DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
kDHHS), THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT: SURVEY OF HOSPITAL

EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 15 app.A (Jan. 2001) (reporting that forty-one percent of hospital
emergency department directors believed that EMTALA has no effect on quality of care and

that such hospitals already had policies and procedures in place to ensure that everyone
received quality care in the emergency department before EMTALA was implemented)
[hereinafter OIG SURVEY].

18.

David U. Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practiceas Social Triage,
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the public hospital either had no insurance or were government-insured
through Medicare or Medicaid.' 9 Most of these patient transfers were not
formally explained or documented in hospital records; only one transfer
many transfers
was explicitly justified as having a medical rationale, 20 but
'
were blatantly attributed to the patient's "inability to pay."'
The Himmelstein study also documented the adverse effects of transfers
on clinical outcomes.22 For example, the researchers found that three
patients died of nervous system trauma because of insufficient care at the
The study also reported that several obstetric
transferring hospital.
patients were transferred to a public hospital, despite the fact that they were
high-risk patients and had initially presented to a private hospital that
served as the state's high-risk obstetrics center.24 Perhaps foreshadowing
the implementation of EMTALA, the authors of the study concluded their
research by calling for additional regulatory standards to reduce the
problem of economically-motivated patient transfers.25
A subsequent study on the issue of patient dumping examined patient
transfers to Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois, the region's only
public hospital, from private hospitals.2 6 Investigators undertook this study
after the number of transfers to Cook County Hospital increased nearly sixfold between 1980 and 1983.27 The authors examined 467 patient transfers
that occurred over a six-week period 28 and documented findings similar to
Himmelstein's. First, the authors found that in examining transfers for
which patient insurance data was available, 95% of patients who were
transferred to the public hospital either had no insurance or were
government-insured.2 9 In addition, the researchers found that in 87% of
cases in which the patient was transferred and a rationale for the transfer
was given, the official at the transferring hospital explicitly mentioned lack
of insurance as the reason for the transfer.30 The investigators found that

74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494, 495 (1984).

19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.

22. Id. at 495.
23. Id.
24. Himmelstein et al., supra note 18, at 496.
25. Id.
26. See Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED.
552, 552 (1986).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 553.
30. Id.
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nearly 25% of patients were unstable at the time of the transfer. 31 Of the
patients who were transferred, few had provided informed consent.32
Furthermore, the investigators found, much as Himmelstein did, that the
public hospital receiving the transferred patients suffered major financial
losses as a result, incurring nearly $24.1 million annually in uncompensated
expenses.3 3
Yet another testament to the extent and effect of the patient dumping
phenomenon was the study by Kellermann and Hackman, which examined
private-to-public hospital patient transfers.34 The authors found that in
nearly 90% of the cases, the transferring private hospital cited "lack of
insurance," "no charity service beds," or "indigent" as the reason for the
transfer.3 5 In addition, the authors found that 55% of the patients studied
were transferred without the requisite advance authorization by the
receiving public hospital, and four patients were transferred in spite of the
public hospital's express refusal to accept them.3 6 Even where transfers
were authorized, the authors found that the very practice of transferring
indigent emergency patients resulted in significant delays in delivering
appropriate medical care, averaging four hours per patient.37 The authors
found that uncompensated care cost the public hospital more than $320,000
over a three-month period.38
In response to the finding that patient dumping was endemic in the
United States, Congress drafted legislation designed "to send a clear signal
to the hospital community, public and private alike, that all Americans,
regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital will provide what
services it can when they are truly in physical distress., 39 The legislation

31. Id. at 554-55 (noting specific instances of egregious cases in which the patient was
unstable). For example, one patient was transferred with head trauma, confusion, other
symptoms and a temperature of only 34.10 C. Id. In another example, a person was
transferred despite falling from confusion as a result of a fall from the third story of a
building. Id.
32. Schiff et al., supra note 26, at 556, 558 (noting that these transfers were improper

since various trade associations in the health care industry-including the American Hospital
Association-had instituted guidelines that mandate informed consent of transfer whenever
possible).
33. Id. at 556 (observing that this amount represented approximately twelve percent of
the yearly operating budget for the county hospital).
34. See Arthur L. Kellermann & Bela B. Hackman, Emergency Department Patient
'Dumping': An Analysis of Interhospital Transfers to the Regional Medical Center at
Memphis, Tennessee, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1287, 1288 (1988).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1289.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1290.
39. 131 CONG. REc. S13892 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
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became known as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act and
was passed as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1985.40
II. THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS
A. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA ")
The core mandate of EMTALA is the requirement that hospitals that
receive federal Medicare funding and have emergency facilities provide a
medical screening examination to "any individual regardless of diagnosis
(e.g., labor, AIDS), financial status (e.g., uninsured, Medicaid), race, color,
national origin (e.g., Hispanic or Native American surnames), handicap,
etc." 41 While the statute's applicability is dependent upon a hospital's
participation in the Medicare program, its protections are not limited solely
to Medicare recipients; they extend to all persons who present to the
EMTALA
emergency department of a Medicare-funded hospital.4 2
provides:
[I]f any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this
subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is made on
the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical
condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening
examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency
department, including ancillary services routinely available to the
emergency department, to 43determine whether or not an emergency
medical condition.. exists.
Under the statute, hospitals cannot delay an initial medical screening to
inquire about a patient's insurance status. 44 If the person is diagnosed with
an "emergency medical condition ' 45 during the medical screening, the
40. Lauren A. Dame, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: The
Anomalous Right to Health Care, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 9 (1998).
41.
HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. (HCFA), DHHS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEDICARE PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS IN EMERGENCY CASES app. v at v19 (May 1998) [hereinafter HCFA INTERPRETATIVE GUIDELINES]. See also Dame, supra
note 40, at 10.
42. Dame, supranote 40, at 10.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000) (internal citation omitted).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (e)(1). This provision defines an "emergency medical
condition" as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical
attention could reasonably be expected to result in-
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statute requires the hospital to stabilize the patient's condition prior to
transfer, subject to a few narrowly defined exceptions.4 6 Both hospitals and
physicians are subject to substantial penalties for violating the provisions of
EMTALA. Maximum civil fines for hospitals range from $25,000 to
$50,000 for each violation,4 7 while physicians who participate in the
wrongful transfer of an unstable patient can be fined up to $50,000, and can
even be excluded from federal and state medical reimbursement programs
for "gross and flagrant" or repeated EMTALA violations.48 EMTALA also
provides for private rights of action against hospitals that violate the statute,
both to patients harmed by a wrongful transfer49 and to hospitals forced to
bear the costs of a wrongful transfer.5 °
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [woman] who is having contractions(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital before
delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or the
unborn child.
46. 42 U.S.C § 1395dd (c)(1) (permitting a hospital to transfer a patient before
stabilization where, 1) the patient requests a transfer, or 2) a physician certifies that the
medical benefit of the transfer would outweigh the attendant risks).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (providing for a maximum civil fine of $25,000 for
hospitals with fewer than 100 beds and a maximum fine of $50,000 for larger hospitals).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). This provision provides that:
Subject to subparagraph (C), any physician who is responsible for the
examination, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating hospital,
including a physician on-call for the care of such an individual, and who
negligently violates a requirement of this section, including a physician who(i) signs a certification under subsection (c)(1)(A) that the medical benefits
reasonably to be expected from a transfer to another facility outweigh the risks
associated with the transfer, if the physician knew or should have known that the
benefits did not outweigh the risks, or
(ii) misrepresents an individual's condition or other information, including a
hospital's obligations under this section,
is subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $50,000 for each such
violation and, if the violation is [is] [sic] gross and flagrant or is repeated, to
exclusion from participation in this title.. . and State health care programs.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). This provision provides that:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating
hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against
the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable
relief as is appropriate.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B). This provision provides that:
Any medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct result of a
participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss1/6

8

2004]

Lee: An EMTALA Primer:
Impact of Changes
An The
EMTALA
Primerin the Emergency Medicine

However, while EMTALA is both broad and ambitious, it nevertheless
suffers from some of the same shortcomings as earlier laws intended to curb
patient dumping. Much like the overly vague state statutes, 5' EMTALA,
too, is vague in several important respects. For example, it is unclear
whether EMTALA's duties and potential penalties apply only to hospitals,
or also to off-campus hospital facilities, including physician's offices,
outpatient departments, and other facilities affiliated with but not physically
part of a hospital campus.52 Because of confusion as to these and other
issues, the agencies charged with enforcing the EMTALA statute have
made several attempts at clarification. 3 The Health Care Financing
Administration 54 issued regulations in 199455 and interpretive guidelines in
1998.56 In 1999, the Office of the Inspector General, a part of DHHS,
issued a special advisory bulletin to clarify how EMTALA affects
individuals enrolled in managed care organizations. 7 However, in spite of
these and other efforts to make the EMTALA requirements more
comprehensible and effective, EMTALA is still widely perceived as being
58
complex and confusing and, hence, a difficult law with which to comply.
B. Regulations and Other Clarification
The Department of Health and Human Services first issued regulations to
implement EMTALA in 1994.59 The regulations are codified primarily in
action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for
financial loss, under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such
equitable relief as is appropriate.
51. Treiger, supra note 5, at 1202.
52. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), EMERGENCY CARE: EMTALA
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, 5-6 (June 2001) [hereinafter EMTALA
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT].

53. See id. at 5-6 (reporting the issuance of new regulations making EMTALA
applicable to off-campus hospital-based departments).
54. The Health Care Financing Administration, an agency of DHHS, was renamed the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in 2001. Throughout this article, both terms are
used interchangeably.
55. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (1994) (as amended) (setting forth as a condition for
participation in Medicare the hospital emergency care requirement).
56. See HFCA INTERPRETATIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 41, app. vat v-13.
57. OIG/HCFA Special Advisory Bulletin on the Patient Anti-Dumping Statute, 64 Fed.
Reg. 61,353 (Nov. 10, 1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
frdump.pdf.
58. Ed Lovem & Jonathan Gardner, Good News on Fraud: GAO Reports Find Most
Providers Don 't Set Out to Defraud Medicare, Medicaid, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 2,
2001, at 4 (stating that the trade association for hospitals-the American Hospital
Association-has asked for additional clarification regarding the responsibilities of providers
under EMTALA).
59. GAO IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 5.
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two sections of Part 489 of 42 C.F.R., which sets forth conditions for
Medicare provider agreements and supplier approval. The main EMTALA
section, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24, states the general requirement that a medical
screening examination be provided to any individual who presents to the
emergency room to determine whether an emergency medical condition
exists. 60 The section also defines several important terms, including "comes
to," "emergency
medical condition," "stabilize," and "appropriate
61
transfer.,
The Department of Health and Human Services followed the issuance of
the regulations with interpretive guidelines in 1998, which provided
additional clarification by setting forth the criteria for investigations of
EMTALA violations, and detailing the indicia of compliance that DHHS
surveyors should look for during an EMTALA investigation.62
For
example, according to the interpretive guidelines for determining if a
patient transfer was appropriate, the surveyor will look through the medical
record and the emergency department log to find evidence that:
[T]he [receiving] hospital had agreed in advance to accept the transfers;
the [receiving] hospital had received appropriate medical records; all
transfers had been effected through qualified personnel, transportation
equipment and medically appropriate life support measures; and the
[receiving] hospital
had available space and qualified personnel to treat
63
the patients.
The interpretive guidelines also detail the requirements for compliance
with 42 C.F.R. § 489.20, which sets out the administrative requirements for
EMTALA compliance. For example, one provision of 42 C.F.R. § 489.20
requires hospitals to post signs in hospital emergency departments
64
informing patients of their rights to emergency treatment and examination.
The interpretive guidelines provide details to assist hospitals in precisely
complying with this regulation:
At a minimum: the sign must specify the rights of individuals with
emergency conditions and women in labor who come to the emergency
department for health care services; it must indicate whether the facility
participates in the Medicaid program; the wording of the sign must be
clear and in simple terms and language that are understandable by the
population served by the hospital; and the sign must be posted in a place

60. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a) (2003).
61. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (2003).
62.

See HFCA INTERPRETATIVE

63.
64.

Id.
42 C.F.R. § 489.20(q) (2003).
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or places likely to be noticed by all individuals entering the emergency
department, as well as those individuals waiting for examination and
area). 65
treatment (e.g., entrance, admitting area, waiting room, treatment
The interpretive guidelines have also addressed the responsibilities of
hospitals in a managed care environment. As will be discussed,6 6 hospitals
often face a serious dilemma when treating managed care patients in the
emergency room, since managed care organizations can retrospectively
deny claims for such treatment if they determine that "emergency" care was
not truly necessary. Thus, a conflict arises: when a managed care patient
presents to an emergency room, the hospital can either comply with the
EMTALA mandate by immediately treating the presenting patient
regardless of the prospects for reimbursement, or comply with the
conditions attached to the patient's insurance coverage and (unlawfully)
delay emergency treatment by first evaluating the severity of the purported
The interpretive guidelines provide clarification of the
emergency.
hospital's responsibility, informing hospitals that regardless of the
participating provider agreements that they may have with managed care
organizations, providers must treat any person who presents to the
department without delaying treatment to consider
emergency
reimbursement issues.67
Because the EMTALA statute has existed for nearly two decades,
hospitals have learned how to skirt the outer bounds of the statute.68 The
interpretive guidelines attempt to prevent some of this "gaming" of the
system. 69 For example, to discourage private hospitals from suggesting that
indigent patients go to a public hospital for "free care," the interpretive
guidelines state that "[h]ospitals may not attempt to coerce individuals into
making judgments against their best interest by informing them that they
will have to pay for their care if they remain, but that their care will be free

65.
66.
67.

HFCA INTERPRETATIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 41, app. v, at v-14.
See discussion infra, Section IV, Subsection B: "The Drawbacks of EMTALA."
See HFCA INTERPRETATIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 41, app. vat v-20, v-23, v-24:

A hospital may not refuse to screen an enrollee of a managed care plan because
the plan refuses to authorize treatment or to pay for such screening and
treatment... A managed health care plan cannot deny a hospital permission to
treat its enrollees. It may only state what it will or will not pay for. Regardless of
whether a hospital will be paid, it is obligated to provide the services specified in
the statute and this regulation... If the individual seeking care is a member [sic]
an HMO or CMP, the hospital's obligation to comply with the requirements of §
489.24 is not affected.
68. See generally OIG/HCFA Special Advisory Bulletin on the Patient Anti-Dumping
Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,353.

69.

See id.
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or at low cost if they transfer to another hospital. 70
Though the guidelines were issued to clarify existing ambiguities,
providers still claim that they are unsure about their responsibilities under
the statute and have asked the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
("CMS") for additional clarification.7 1
III. ENFORCEMENT

A. Generally
The OIG and the CMS are both charged with EMTALA enforcement.72
Each agency performs a distinct function: CMS has the power to terminate
the Medicare participation of a noncompliant hospital or physician, while
the OIG's punitive "stick" is its authority to assess civil monetary
penalties.7 3
The CMS receives complaints at its regional offices; 74 the complaints

from each state are then directed to the state agency responsible for
investigating EMTALA violations.75 The state agency gathers pertinent
information 76 and returns the information to the regional CMS office. The
regional office must then determine whether there was an EMTALA
violation. If the regional office finds an EMTALA violation, it notifies the
hospital that the hospital will be terminated from participation in federallyfunded programs unless the hospital proposes and undertakes appropriate
corrective measures.77 The regional office provides the hospital with a
notice of termination as well as a statement of deficiencies, indicating the
problems to be corrected to bring the hospital into compliance with the
statute.78 If a violation is found to involve a medical issue, for example
whether a patient was properly stabilized prior to transfer, a peer review
HFCA INTERPRETATIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 41, at v-26.
71. OIG SURVEY, supra note 17, at 13 (staff citing the need for more precise definitions
for "emergency medical condition," "medical screening exam," and "stable for discharge");
Lovern & Gardner, supra note 58, at 4.
72. Dame, supra note 40, at 11.
73. Id.
74. OIG, DHHS, THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT: THE
70.

ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 7 (2001) [hereinafter OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS].

CMS website, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/survey-cert/rodir.pdf
CMS regional offices).
75.

See also the

(listing the ten

OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supra note 74, at 7.

76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 8; Dame, supra note 40, at 12.
78. Dame, supra note 40, at 12. It is important to note that most hospitals submit a plan
of correction in a timely manner and thus are not subsequently terminated from the Medicare
program. GAO IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 17.
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organization ("PRO") reviews the medical issue from a physician's
perspective.7 9 After the PRO has reviewed the case, the regional CMS
office notifies the OIG so that the OIG can determine whether to assess
fines against the provider.80
B. Department of Health andHuman Services
Office of the Inspector General
The OIG has been fairly active in assessing the impact of EMTALA on
various providers within the health care system, as the agency has authored
81
These studies illustrate the
several reports on EMTALA enforcement.
EMTALA statute and its
the
with
compliance
scope of awareness of and
studies are briefly
these
Accordingly,
accompanying regulations.
summarized below.
The OIG recently conducted a random survey ("Survey") of emergency
82
department personnel to determine the level of awareness of EMTALA.
The Survey was conducted via a telephone and mail survey of more than
83
The findings suggest that most
100 randomly selected hospitals.
emergency department physicians and staff are familiar with many of
EMTALA's requirements.8 4 Most providers believe that they comply with
EMTALA's mandates; only 4% of staff believe that an inappropriate
85
transfer has occurred at their facility in the last year. Forty-one percent of
emergency department directors say patient care at their hospital has not
been affected by EMTALA, claiming that their hospital has always ensured
appropriate screening and stabilization procedures were in place without
6
Simply put, many emergency
regard to a patient's ability to pay.
department administrators believe that their hospital's internal policies and
procedures alone effectively ensure that all patients are appropriately cared

79.

OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supra note 74, at 16.

80. EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 23 (stating that
the OIG will consider various factors in determining whether or not to impose a fine,
including whether the hospital took corrective action; the financial condition of the hospital;
and the potential impact of the fine on a hospital's ability to provide care). See also 42
C.F.R. § 1003.106(a)(1) (2003).
81.

See generally OIG SURVEY, supra note 17; OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supra note

74.
82. OIG SURVEY, supra note 17, at 1.
83. Id. at 8-9 (stating that the OIG attempted to select an approximately equal number of
small, medium, and large hospitals, as determined by bed size). Because the agency
received what it considered a fairly representative response rate, it believes the results can be
extrapolated to emergency departments in general. Id.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id. at 15.
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for in the absence of governmental intervention.
The OIG also recently studied the effectiveness of the EMTALA
enforcement process, yielding valuable information about the strengths and
weaknesses of the process.87 For example, the study ("Enforcement
Study") noted that, in contrast to the state agencies charged with EMTALA
investigation which are required to turn around complaints in fifteen to
twenty days, 88 regional CMS offices took nearly sixty-five days after the
state's investigation to determine whether a complaint was substantiated. 89
The Enforcement Study found that the time between investigation and the
issuance of findings has increased substantially between fiscal years 1994
and 1998.90 The OIG also cited as problematic the significant variance
from region to region of the EMTALA-related workload. 9'
The
Enforcement Study cited examples of extreme variation from year to year.92
Finally, the OIG cited poor tracking systems for complaints and
resolution of EMTALA cases as impeding enforcement efforts.93 Because
each region uses its own methodology for reporting monthly EMTALA
violations, data collection and management is inconsistent and incomplete,
which limits CMS's ability to track and improve its efforts.94 Officials at
the regional offices attribute the data collection problems to a lack of
guidance from the central office.95 A recent report by the General
Accounting Office supports the contention that tracking civil monetary
96
penalty collection is a growing problem for CMS.
Although EMTALA grants the OIG the power to impose civil monetary
penalties against noncompliant providers, the OIG also has the discretion
not to fine providers. 97 Thus, most EMTALA violations do not result in
fines.98 One estimate by an OIG official found that, although 180 to 210
87. OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supranote 74, at 1-2.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id. (noting that seven regional offices sometimes took a year or more to determine
whether a complaint was substantiated, and that such lengthy delays defeated the primary
purpose of EMTALA: "to address immediate threats to patient health and safety.").
90. Id. at 13.
91. Id.
92. Id. (finding that in 1994, for example, one of the largest regions handled 119
EMTALA cases compared to only three EMTALA cases in 1998 while another region
registered forty-two cases in 1996 and only seven in 1998).
93. OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supranote 74, at 15.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally GAO, CIVIL FINES AND PENALTIES DEBT: REVIEW OF CMS'
MANAGEMENT AND COLLECTION PROCESSES 2-3 (2001) (finding that civil monetary penalty
receivables for CMS stood at $260 million as of Sept. 30, 2000).
97. See EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 17.
98. OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supranote 74, at 8.
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violations are typically identified each year, only nineteen fines were
assessed to hospitals in 2001.99
In recent years, the government appears to have increased its
The number of
commitment to pursuing noncompliant providers.
settlements in EMTALA cases, as well as the amount of such settlements,
has increased sharply. 100 In fiscal year 1997, the OIG fined fourteen
hospitals a total of $500,000. l 01 By the end of fiscal year 2000, the OIG
fined forty-eight hospitals $1.2 million. 10 2 Still, the number of EMTALA
cases in which the OIG imposes a civil monetary penalty represents a small
fraction of the total number of confirmed violations. 10 3 Between January 1,
1995, and March 20, 2001, the OIG declined to impose a civil monetary
1°4
penalty in 61% of cases forwarded to the office by CMS.
IV. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF EMTALA

A. The Benefits of EMTALA
EMTALA has the potential to become an effective means of ensuring
that each person receives adequate emergency medical care as and when
needed. While no statute can guarantee the best possible medical outcome
in every case, the law can at least hold providers to an acceptable minimum
standard in making available quality emergency care. In this regard,
EMTALA has already shown itself to be effective in establishing an
acceptable level of care.
For example, many providers may be motivated to comply with
EMTALA simply out of fear of its investigatory mechanisms.
Additionally, EMTALA's vague language assures that providers work
harder to comply with its intent. It is noteworthy that providers have gained
a better understanding of the statute due to increasing guidance from federal
agencies. Finally, case law is evolving to clarify some of EMTALA's
ambiguities, which also improves providers' understanding0 5of the statute
EMTALA.1
and provides additional guidance on the scope of
Small Share of Patient Dumping Nets Fines: Mitigating Factors Get Hospitals Off
Hook, HEALTH CARE POL'Y, Oct. 2, 2001, at 1502 [hereinafter Patient Dumping Nets Fines].
100. OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, supra note 74, at 9 (attributing at least some of the
recent increase to the OIG's clearing its backlog of older cases).
101. PatientDumping Nets Fines,supra note 99, at 1502.
102. Id.
103. EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 17.
104. Id. at 24.
105. See, e.g., Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253 (1999); Baber v. Hosp.
Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group,
Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990).
99.
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1. Many Providers Are Motivated to Comply with EMTALA
Simply Out of Fear of Its Investigatory Mechanisms
The EMTALA statute has been somewhat effective in guaranteeing
access to all who present to emergency departments. The prospect of an
EMTALA investigation has resulted in behavioral modifications on the part
of many providers: nearly 50% of hospitals changed some policy or
procedure because of the initiation of an EMTALA investigation by
06
CMS. 1

2. EMTALA's Vague Language Assures That Providers Work Harder
to Comply with Its Intent, and Guidance from Federal Agencies
Has Given Providers a Better Understanding of the Statute
EMTALA's intentionally vague language has eliminated potential
loopholes that providers may have used to deny poor persons emergency
care. However, many critics in the provider community argue that they
have been unable to fully comply with EMTALA because it is overly

vague. °7 However, while it may be true that EMTALA is vague in aspects,
one CMS administrator recently noted that the statute is purposefully vague
since not all conduct can be anticipated by the statute and
regulations. 0 8While a morass of regulation in the face of vagueness can be
problematic, CMS has attempted to provide guidance on several levels for
providers. 0 9 CMS continues to generate useful guidelines; for example, a
1999 special advisory bulletin recommended a number of "best practices"
to aid hospitals with EMTALA compliance. 110 Further, the attempts by the
agency in 1998 to clarify the statute through regulations and interpretive
guidelines are laudable."' However, despite the increased guidance, the
OIG found that many providers are not aware that guidelines have been

issued.'

12

106.

OIG SURVEY, supra note 17, at 19.
107.
See, e.g., David A. Ansell & Robert L. Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status,
Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500, 1502 (1987) (stating that
"stabilization" is a vague term that needs clarification).
108.
Barry R. Furrow, An Overview and Analysis of the Impact of the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 325, 329 (1995) (citing 39 Fed.
Reg. 32,099 (1994)).
109. Provider Agreements and Supplier Approval, 42 C.F.R. § 489 (2003) (codification
of EMTALA regulations); OIG/HCFA Special Advisory Bulletin on the Patient AntiDumping Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,353 (Nov. 10, 1999).
110. OIG ENFORCEMENT, supra note 74, at 9. See also News Release, OIG, Special
Advisory Bulletin Outlines Hospitals' Obligations to Provide Emergency Services to
Managed Care Enrollees (Nov. 9, 1999).
111. See HCFA INTERPRETATIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 41.
112. See OIG SURVEY, supra note 17, at 10.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss1/6

16

2004]

Lee: An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine

An EMTALA Primer

3. Case Law Is Clarifying Ambiguities, Improving Providers'
Understanding of the Statute, and Providing Additional
Guidance on EMTALA's Scope
Prior to 1999, there was a split of opinion among the judicial circuits as
to whether an improper motive was required for an EMTALA violation to
exist. The United States Supreme Court, in Roberts v. Galen, settled this
dispute. The court held that no showing of improper motive on part of the
3 However,
hospital was required to sustain a violation of EMTALA."
before Galen, circuits, such as the Sixth Circuit, required proof of an
improper economic motive 4in order to sustain a cause of action against a
provider under EMTALA.I1
The impetus for the improper motive requirement was the landmark
15
In
Sixth Circuit case Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.'
emergency
an
after
died
child
Cleland, the plaintiffs' fifteen-year-old
department physician misdiagnosed the symptoms of vomiting and
cramping as the flu." 6 Shortly thereafter, the child suffered cardiac arrest
and died. 17 The plaintiffs brought an EMTALA claim, alleging that the
defendant hospital and physicians did not provide an appropriate medical
screening examination, failed to treat their son's condition, and failed to
The Sixth Circuit held that the
stabilize him, as required by the statute.'
improperly screened patients
hospital
the
that
prove
to
plaintiffs failed
based on their ability to pay. When the hospital discharged the child he was
in a stable condition, not in acute distress, and neither the doctors nor the
9
parents indicated that the child's condition was worsening." The Sixth
Circuit relied on the legislative history of the statute, which demonstrated
to provide a guarantee of the result of
that Congress did not intend
20
treatment.
room
emergency
The Sixth Circuit stated that inadequate screening rests upon what was
"appropriate.' 2' If the hospital acts "in the same manner as it would have
for the usual paying patient, then the screening provided is 'appropriate'
within the meaning of the statute." 122 A hospital's improper motive for
screening patients is not appropriate and may give rise to liability under
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253 (1999).
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at269.
Id.at271.
Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
Id.at 272.
Id.at 272.
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EMTALA. Improper motives include a hospital's economic motive based
on the patient's ability to pay, as argued in Cleland; prejudice against the
race, sex or ethnicity of a patient; and the personal dislike of a patient or his
occupation or the distaste for a patient's medical condition, as if a patient
was improperly screened because he or she has AIDS.
Though Clelandbecame the rule in the Sixth Circuit, it clearly reflected
a minority view, as its decision received negative treatment by several
circuits. 12
One reason the decision received negative treatment was
because EMTALA does not explicitly mention an improper motive
requirement.1 24 Courts that follow the Clelandholding arguably bypass the
plain meaning requirement of statutory interpretation.
Curing the split of opinions in the circuits over the improper motive
requirement, the Supreme Court, in Roberts v. Galen, held that improper
1215
motive is not required under the statute when stabilization is at issue.
The Galen case is illustrative of how the evolution of case law provides
guidance to hospitals on what is required by the EMTALA statute.
B. The Drawbacks of EMTALA
Though EMTALA is a potentially useful tool to ensure adequate
emergency medical care, it has several drawbacks. First, EMTALA can be
misused by managed care organizations to effectively eliminate insurers'
responsibility to reimburse providers for services rendered in the emergency
department. Second, because EMTALA represents an unfunded mandate, it
has exacerbated existing financial problems that hospitals face. Third, there
are inadequate systems in place to assess the effectiveness of the statute and
related enforcement efforts. Fourth, the statute disproportionately impacts
inner-city, rural, and public hospitals. Fifth, EMTALA can be misused by
the plaintiffs' bar when EMTALA complaints are simply appended to state
medical malpractice claims to remove cases to federal court.

123. The decision received negative treatment by the First, Fourth, Eighth, and District
of Columbia Circuits. See Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1138

(8th Cir. 1996); Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1194 n.9 (1st Cir. 1995);
Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 857 (4th Cir. 1994); Gatewood v. Wash.
Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
124.

Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d at 857 (rejecting the improper motive requirement,

stating "there is nothing in the statute itself that requires proof of indigence, inability to pay,
or any other improper motive on the part of a hospital as a prerequisite to recovery").
125. Galen, 525 U.S. at 253.
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1. The EMTALA Statute Can Be Misused by Managed Care Organizations
to Effectively Eliminate Insurers' Responsibility to Reimburse
Providers for Services That Are Rendered in
the Emergency Department
Today, managed care is the dominant means by which most Americans
receive health insurance. 126 In 2002, 76.1 million Americans were enrolled
in health maintenance organizations.12 7 Historically, hospitals were
reimbursed under a fee-for-service system in which they were reimbursed
fully for their costs. 128 Prior to the growth in managed care, hospitals were
able to shift costs of bad debt, charity, and uncompensated care to privately
insured patients. 29 However, as managed care became more pervasive,
130
these insurance entities would not allow cost-shifting to occur.
Under most managed care plans, some type of pre-authorization is
3
is reimbursable.' '
required before a patient can receive treatment that
Many hospital administrators claim that managed care organizations deny
reimbursement claims submitted by providers or hospitals based on
retrospective review of charts.132 Providers assert that the insurance
industry practice of ensuring coverage without paying for it leaves
emergency departments with costly bills. 133 As a result, physicians and
hospital administrators have asked for assistance from the CMS, as well as
34
CMS has responded by
from the OIG, to correct this alleged bias.'
indicating that it is powerless to remedy this problem since CMS can only
regulate health insurers where it has the leverage of Medicare and Medicaid
participation (i.e., federally-funded programs). 35 Since many managed
126. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COMPREHENSIVE DATA ON HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS COVERAGE, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/
tables/2003/03hus132.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
127. Id.
128. Lisa M. Enfield & David P. Sklar, Patient Dumping in the Hospital Emergency
Department:Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 561, 563 (1988).
129. Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room,
46 STAN. L. REV. 449, 469 (1994) (stating that in 1994 hospitals charged insured patients
over 154% of emergency department expenses to offset losses from uncompensated care).
130. Id. at 469.
OIG/HCFA Special Advisory Bulletin on the Patient Anti-Dumping Statute, 64
131.
Fed. Reg. at 61,354.
132.

OIG SURVEY, supra note 17, at 16.

133. Id.
134. OIG/HCFA Special Advisory Bulletin on the Patient Anti-Dumping Statute, 64
Fed. Reg. at 61,354 (stating that commentators "indicated that unless prior authorization
requirements are abandoned or prohibited altogether, huge bills could result for patients
whose care had not been authorized in advance").
135. Id. (stating that CMS "doles] not have the authority under the patient anti-dumping
statute to mandate reimbursement for emergency services or to regulate non-Medicare and
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care organizations do not offer managed care products on behalf of
Medicare and Medicaid and solely function in the private sector, the federal
government has little authority to regulate such plans.
While federal authorities have indicated that there is little that they can
do to correct the one-sided benefit that managed care organizations receive
relative to hospitals, some state officials have attempted to correct this
problem. The GAO reports that thirty-six states and the District of
Columbia have laws related to standards that managed care organizations
must adhere to in order to ensure that hospitals are not retrospectively
denied payment for services provided in the emergency department. 136
Many states have adopted a "prudent layperson" standard to distinguish an
emergency situation from a non-emergency situation. 137 Under such a
standard, "emergency services" are often defined as "those health care
services provided to evaluate and treat medical conditions of recent onset
and severity that would lead a prudent layperson, possessing an average
knowledge of medicine and health, to believe that urgent and/or
unscheduled medical care is required.' ' 138 The prudent layperson standard
recognizes that the average layperson without medical training is not
necessarily equipped to determine whether a true medical emergency
exists. 39
There is no single objective definition of emergency services in the
prudent layperson context. Maryland, for example, defines "emergency
services" as "those health care services that are provided in a hospital
emergency facility after the sudden onset of a medical condition that
manifests itself by symptoms of sufficient severity, including severe pain,
that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be

non-Medicaid managed care plans").
136. See EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 13 (citing
reports from the American College of Emergency Physicians). See also KEN KING, AM.
COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, ISSUE PAPER Topic: PRUDENT LAYPERSON STATUS (Mar.
2002) (stating that the following thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted
a prudent layperson or similar standard for access to emergency medical services: Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin),
availableat http://www.acep.org/library/pdf/issue_plstatus.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
137. KING,supra note 136, at 1.
138. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians Reimbursement Comm., Fighting Managed
Care Denials in the Emergency Department, at 5 (1999), available at
http://www.acep.org/library/pdf/mgdcaredenial.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
139. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/370g(h) (2002) (defining a "prudent layperson"
as one "who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine").
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expected by a prudent layperson."' 140 Virginia adopted a prudent layperson
standard, which provides that emergency services are:
[T]hose health care services that are rendered by affiliated or
nonaffiliated providers after the sudden onset of a medical condition that
manifests itself by symptoms of sufficient severity, including severe pain,
that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected by a prudent laylerson who possesses an average knowledge of
health and medicine ....
Therefore, by granting "emergency services" a more expansive meaning
using the prudent layperson standard, states have attempted to decrease the
likelihood that managed care organizations will retrospectively deny
payment on the basis that no emergency condition existed at the time the
patient went to the emergency department. Though several states have
introduced and subsequently enacted legislation encompassing the prudent
layperson standard, there has been no significant progress in developing
similar legislation on the federal level with regard to private sector health
plans.
At the same time, managed care organizations have softened their stance
against providing payment for emergency services. 14 In 1997, the major
trade association for managed care plans-the American Association of
Health Plans ("AAHP")-announced a customer service and patient's
rights initiative designed to improve the public image of managed care
organizations. Through this initiative, the AAHP indicated that "health
plans should cover emergency-room screening and stabilization as needed
for conditions that reasonably appear to constitute an emergency, based on
the patient's presenting symptoms.

'143

However, because of the lack of

dominion by the federal government over managed care organizations,
health care providers continue to insist that they are left to cover emergency
claims that managed care organizations retrospectively deny. 144
140. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-701(e) (2001).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300 (Michie 2001).
142. See AM. ASS'N OF HEALTH PLANS (AAHP), CODE OF CONDUCT (stating the
philosophy that member plans should cover the cost of emergency services), available at
http://www.aahp.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutAAHP/WhatWeStandFor/Code_o
f Conduct/Code of Conduct.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
143. Id. See also Joan M. Stieber & Linda J. Spar, EMTALA in the '90s - Enforcement
Challenges, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 57, 79-80 n.72 (1998) (citing a press release from the AAHP
that urges managed care organizations to provide appropriate reimbursement to providers
when enrollee has sought care in an emergency situation).
144. OIG SURVEY, supra note 17, at 16 (stating "private managed care organizations
deny or reduce payment for mandated medical screening exams when the patient is found
not to have an emergency condition").
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2. Because EMTALA Represents an Unfunded Mandate,
It Has Exacerbated Existing Financial Problems That
Hospitals Are Facing
Hospital administrators cite cost concerns on several different levels. 45
Despite the fact that not-for-profit hospitals already face a delicate financial
situation, recently enacted legislation has worsened their financial position.
For example, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ("BBA") reduced Medicare
spending growth $115 billion over five years. 146 Though there has been
147
some relief from the BBA through the passage of subsequent legislation,
the hospital industry is facing a fiscal crisis, hospitals face a growing
number of financial constraints that make it difficult for them to operate
cost centers that lose money.148 In 1999, the average margin for the not-forprofit hospital sector was 4.7%. 149
Increased misuse of the emergency department by managed care
enrollees exacerbates hospitals' cost concerns. Uninsured persons and
Medicaid enrollees often seek care in the emergency department, rather
than in a physician's office. 150 In 1979, 29 million people were without
152
insurance. 151 By 2002, this number had risen to nearly 43.6 million.

Emergency departments are feeling the financial impact of providing
uncompensated care; in Los Angeles, ten of eighteen trauma centers have

145. See, e.g., News Release, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Hospital Employment Cost Increases
Accelerate (Jan. 1, 2002) (describing the increase in employment-related costs for hospitals).
See also AM. HOsp. ASS'N & THE LEWIN GROUP, TREND WATCH, HOSPITAL FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE 1 (Jan. 1999) (citing a decrease in cost shifting and a decrease in revenues
from private payors).

146. Karen Pallarito, Plugging the Holes: CFOs Work to Offset Cutbacks Under
Balanced-BudgetLaw, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 11, 1998, at 84.
147.

See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H11209, HI 1217 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2000) (statement of

Rep. Linder, who provided a letter from the Federation of American Hospitals that pledged
support for the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement Act of 2000, which
would address "some of the excesses in the BBA, and restor[e] stability to our health care
delivery system"). See also Jonathan Gardner, Rate Increases Likely to Gain Approval,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 11, 2000, at 46 (stating that the Balanced Budget Refinement
Act is likely to provide $2.1 billion in relief for providers participating in Medicare+Choice).
148.

Am.

HosP.

ASS'N

&

THE

LEwIN

GROUP,

TREND

WATCH,

EMERGENCY

DEPARTMENTS - AN ESSENTIAL ACCESS POINT TO CARE 1, 7 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter TREND
WATCH

EMERGENCY

DEPARTMENTS],

available at

http://www.hospitalconnect.com/

ahapolicyforum/trendwatch/content/twmarch200 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
149. Id. at 7.
150. Id. at2.
151. See Treiger, supra note 5, at 1193.
152. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN UNITED STATES: 2002
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf (last visited

Oct. 27, 2003).
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closed, in part, due to the heavy burden of providing such care. 153 In light
of the increasing number of uninsured, the demand on emergency
department resources is likely to continue.
3. Inadequate Systems Are in Place to Assess the Effectiveness
of the Statute and Related Enforcement Efforts
As described in Section III, the number of EMTALA violations over the
last decade has increased substantially. However, this increase may be the
result of causes other than that of just patient dumping for economic
considerations. Currently, DHHS and CMS do not have the appropriate
information systems in place to determine what factors are actually driving
the increase in EMTALA violations. The increase may be due simply to an
increase in the number of emergency department visits, which makes it
more likely that violations will occur.154Alternatively, the increase may be
attributable to the financial situations of hospitals. Certain hospitals are
being forced to shoulder more of the burden of providing care to
indigents. 155 Statistics support the notion that, while the number of visits to
emergency departments has increased, the number of hospitals with
emergency departments has decreased. 56 Where hospitals are attempting to
remain financially viable, they may not be as receptive to providing charity
and uncompensated care as they have been historically.
Accordingly, improved methods of separating out the various causes of
EMTALA violations may assist the government in determining where its
focus should lie in EMTALA enforcement. Without improvements in
information systems, it is impossible to apportion the increase in the
number of EMTALA violations to the appropriate cause. Such an inability
to measure the impact of EMTALA is a drawback to the statute, as
policymakers are unable to quantitatively ascertain whether the statute is
serving its intended purpose of ensuring access to all persons to quality
health care services.
4. The EMTALA Statute Disproportionately Impacts
Inner City, Rural, and Public Hospitals
Hospitals that treat a large number of indigent patients often receive a

153.

See Olson, supra note 129, at 476.

154. See TREND WATCH EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS, supra note 148, at 1 (providing that
the average number of emergency department visits per hospital in 1999 was over 20,000, an
increase of nearly 4000 since 1990).
155. Id. (citing a growing number of emergency visits at fewer hospitals).
156. Id. (providing that by 1999 approximately 4700 hospitals had emergency
department visits, down from over 5100 in 1990).
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subsidy from the federal government for providing a disproportionate share
of care to such populations in the form of a disproportionate share hospital
("DSH") payment. 157 However, the DSH subsidy is often inadequate
because it does not appropriately compensate the hospitals that treat a
disproportionate share of indigents. Additionally, states do not provide
158
adequate guidance as to which hospitals should receive the subsidy.
Because of the lack of clarity as to how subsidies are calculated, poor
hospitals languish in their inability to secure appropriate relief necessary to
subsidize the care of disproportionately indigent patients while other
hospitals that are not treating significant numbers of uninsured or
underinsured patients receive a subsidy that they do not necessarily deserve.
'51
Such an inequity disproportionately impacts the financial health of
urban and rural hospitals, and could potentially force the closure of such
hospitals, thereby making them unable to offer health care services to their
communities.
5. The EMTALA Statute Is Misused by the Plaintiffs' Bar When
EMTALA Complaints Are Simply Appended to State
Medical Malpractice Claims to Remove
Cases to Federal Court
Many critics of the statute have complained that EMTALA is used to
supplant state malpractice statutes, contrary to the legislative intent of the
statute. Commentators contend that the legislative history of the statute
demonstrates that EMTALA was not intended to function
as a federal
60
received.
care
of
quality
the
regulating
statute
malpractice
V. SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Patient dumping remains a problem despite the continued existence of
EMTALA and an increasing amount of federal guidance. However, there
are several means available to address some of the problems identified
157.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F) (2000).

See also 42 U.S.C.A. §

1395ww(d)(5)(F) (West 2003).
158.

See Teaching Hospitals and Medicare DisproportionateShare Hospital Payments:

Hearingbefore the House Subcomm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 16 (1997) (statement
of Rep. Stark) (stating the need for a "new formula to figure out which hospitals really are
under pressure from the uninsured and the underinsured and what kind of a proxy to use to
recalculate that").
159. See Letter from Michael Hash, HFCA Deputy Adm'r, to Senator William Roth,
Chairman of the Senate Fin. Comm. (Oct. 15, 1999) (explaining that where hospitals receive
additional DSH payments, HCFA will not hold them liable because guidance on how to
claim
DSH
payments
was
not
sufficiently
clear),
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd1 1499.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
160. OIG SURVEY, supra 17, at 14. See also Furrow,supra note 108, at 326.
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A. The OIG and CMS Should ProvideAdditional ClarificationThrough
Guidance and New Interpretive Guidelines to Assist Providers in
UnderstandingTheir Responsibilities Under the Statute
A General Accounting Office report found that many providers are not
out to defraud the federal government; they are simply unclear about their
responsibilities under the statute. 161 In fact, more than 40% of physicians
and 60% of emergency department directors assert that some part of the
statute is unclear. 162 CMS has admitted that some of its guidance and
regulations have been unclear. 163 However, continued clarification is
important, as the provider community has expressed frustration over its
inability to understand EMTALA and its related regulations
B. Congress Should Address the SuperiorPosition That Managed Care
OrganizationsPossess by EnactingFederalLegislation That
Includes a "PrudentLayperson" Standardfor All
InsuranceDeterminations
Various legislative initiatives that have been introduced would mandate
managed care organizations to pay for emergency services where
"emergency" is determined from a reasonable patient or prudent layperson
standard. 164 This is fairly synonymous with the "prudent layperson"
standard. 165 As previously mentioned, managed care organizations that
participate in federally-funded programs already must make reimbursement
decisions from a prudent layperson perspective under the BBA. However,
many plans are exempt from this standard because they do not offer a
Medicare or Medicaid managed care product.
C. Congress Should GrantFinancialRelief to ProvidersSo That They
Can Remain Viable in the Current Competitive Landscape
If Congress decides that public policy requires the provision of
emergency services to all persons regardless of ability to pay, Congress
must be prepared to pay to support the provision of such services. There
161. EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 15.
162. See Lovem & Gardner, supra note 58, at 4.
163. See EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52, at 15.
164. See, e.g., Quality Health Care and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1222, 105th
Cong. (1997); S. 373, 105th Cong. (1997); Managed Care Bill of Rights for Consumers Act
of 2001, H.R. 2947, 107th Cong. (2001).
165. See supra Section IV, discussion describing the benefits and drawbacks of the
statute.
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are several means to ensure payment for emergency services.
First, the disproportionate share hospital payment could be increased.
This would ensure the continued existence of poor hospitals that treat a
disproportionate share of the uninsured and underinsured. However, if this
route is taken, government officials should consider revising the
complicated formula that determines which hospitals receive the DSH
payments. The current formula benefits many hospitals which are not
committed to treating a disproportionately indigent patient population; this
is patently unfair.
Alternatively, the federal government could provide a subsidy to all
hospitals to fund the EMTALA mandate. One vehicle by which this might
be accomplished is by improving Medicaid reimbursement by reimbursing
physicians at or above the cost that they incur to treat patients. Increasing
reimbursement might improve general access to primary care services,
which would allow emergency departments to function as places of last
resort instead of as primary care treatment centers. Additionally, because
reimbursement levels for Medicaid are often low, many physicians in
private practice do not accept patients insured by Medicaid. 166 If Medicaid
funding were improved, there would be several related benefits: ensuring
primary care services outside of emergency departments; and ensuring
reimbursements for emergency and general medical care for those in
greatest need.
D. Hospitals Should Educate PatientsAbout Preventionand the Proper
Use of the Emergency Departmentand Social Policy Must be
Addressed in Arenas Other Than Health Care
Forcing the health care system to affect change in social policy is an
inefficient use of the already insufficient resources that exist for the health
care industry. One report from the New York Academy of Medicine
suggested that $100 million is spent annually in emergency departments
treating victims of violence and an additional $100 million is spent on
"violence-related" hospitalizations. 67 In 1990, a physician at Cook County
Hospital in Chicago, Illinois suggested that Chicago's seven trauma centers
combined lose about $10 to $12 million annually, primarily from
"penetrating trauma" cases, 168 most often involving stabbings and gunshot
wounds.

166.

See Olson, supra note 129, at 478.

167.

Karen Pallarito, Health Pros Ally Against Violence, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 2,

1994, at 40.
168.

Lynn Wagner, Hospitals Feeling Trauma of Violence, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb.

5, 1990, at 23.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss1/6

26

2004]

Lee: An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine

An EMTALA Primer

Trauma units for inner-city hospitals are particularly susceptible to losses
associated with social problems. One such hospital reported a 204%
increase in patients treated as a result of gunshot wounds.16 9 Trauma units

in such hospitals often are responsible for a disproportionate amount of
uncompensated care.' 70 At yet another hospital, the 71trauma unit is
responsible for 44% of the hospital's uncompensated care.,
If the nation continues to force the health care industry to take
responsibility for social ills, such as drug abuse and gang violence, there
may be severe consequences, including the closure of several hospitals.
Illustratively, by 1990 Chicago had lost three Level I trauma centers (i.e.,
those equipped to handle the most severe emergencies), as they were forced
to close due to "unsustainable losses."'' 72 Though a discussion of creating
and funding social programs and other such alternatives is beyond the scope
of this paper, the availability and funding of such programs should be
addressed. To those who suggest that such alternatives are too costly, the
short-term cost of establishing such programs is likely much less than the
number of dollars per episode that must be spent (and may not be
reimbursed) in the emergency department. Particularly salient is the fact
that while one emergency department encounter as a result of penetrating
trauma may cost thousands of dollars in the treatment of the victim, such
victims who are involved in drug abuse and violence may end up making
several trips to the emergency department if the destructive underlying
behaviors are not addressed.
It should also be noted that prevention and the provision of social
alternatives becomes an important issue with regard to ensuring that people
know how to make proper use of the emergency department. Hospitals
should make patients aware of the increased cost of receiving care from the
emergency department versus through a primary care physician. This
would particularly be useful for patients who have a primary care physician
(i.e., managed care enrollees) but are simply too impatient to wait for an
appointment. Because of third-party insurance, such patients are often
insensitive to medical costs. Managed care organizations could consider
denying payment or instituting a more substantial co-payment that the
patient incurs when using the emergency room for primary care. As for
most uninsured persons who receive primary care services through the
emergency room, the establishment of neighborhood clinics and other
alternatives to care may prove useful in ensuring receipt of prompt
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.(referring to the MedStar trauma unit at Washington Hospital Center).
Id.
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treatment.
E. The Government Must Examine Its Role in EMTALA
Enforcement andAddress Existing Problems
Both the OIG and the CMS must re-examine their roles in EMTALA
enforcement. Recent reports from the OIG suggest that problems still exist:
the number of EMTALA complaints and confirmed violations is on the
rise. 173 These agencies must continuously re-evaluate their roles in ensuring
that patients have access to emergency departments without regard to the
patient's ability to pay. For example, the prosecutorial discretion that the
OIG enjoys may contribute to the impotence of the statute. In addition, the
inability of the government to communicate with providers is problematic.
Differential enforcement across the country also weakens the statute. While
the OIG has recognized some of these problems, it must implement the
appropriate system and policies to ensure that such problems are corrected.
The prosecutorial discretion that the 0IG has in imposing civil monetary
penalties should be reduced or eliminated because the OIG imposes civil
monetary penalties in so few cases with confirmed violations that there is a
perceived lack of force behind the statute. The alternate remedytermination of participation in federally-funded programs-is also rarely
carried out because hospitals almost always submit a timely plan of
correction before the termination deadline. 7 4 Thus, the OIG must become
more involved in holding facilities accountable for complying with the
statute using civil monetary penalties that force providers to be attentive to
their conduct in the emergency department.
Another problem that weakens the statute is the government's perceived
inability to communicate with providers. Many providers complain, for
example, that they are not informed when an EMTALA investigation has
been completed. 7 5 The time it takes between investigating an EMTALA
complaint and the regional office to make a determination has increased
substantially between fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year 1998,176 suggesting
that CMS and its subcontractor state agencies may need to examine their
respective hiring needs.
173. See supra Section IV for a discussion on the increase in EMTALA complaints and
violations.
174. OIG ENFORCEMENT, supra note 74, at 8.
175. Id. at 12 (suggesting that the enforcement process is compromised by delays and
inadequate feedback after the OIG found that CMS regional offices take nearly sixty-five
days after the State's investigation to determine whether a violation had occurred and that
seventy percent of the regional offices took up to a year to determine whether a hospital
violated EMTALA).
176. Id. at 13.
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Finally, variance in the level of enforcement across regions and over time
compromises the effectiveness of the statute. Such variance in enforcement
is problematic. For example, when the number of EMTALA violations in a
region decreases from more than 100 cases in one year to three cases the
next year, 177 one questions the consistency of enforcement.
VI. FOLLOW-UP ISSUES

A. Cost Considerations
Americans must determine whether they are willing to continue to
subsidize care for the uninsured. In the United States, health care is not a
right; 78 however, in crafting EMTALA, Congress decided, as a matter of
public policy, that access to emergency services was a right of all
persons. 179 Thus, in order to continue to provide emergency services to all
persons who present to an emergency department, Americans must pay for
these services.
No matter how this is done, payment must be made for services that are
rendered. It is irresponsible to mandate that hospitals must provide
emergency services and leave them with the entire financial burden of
treatment. Health care is a competitive business and facilities cannot
operate unless they produce revenue sufficient to cover their costs. This
will not occur if the current environment continues in which EMTALA
represents an unfunded mandate.
B. The Future of EMTALA Post-September 11, 2001
Though federal and state governments have approved various legislative
initiatives that represent commitments to improved funding for the health
80
those priorities
care industry and relief from previous budgetary cuts,
2001. Post11,
September
seem to have changed after the tragic events of
177. Id.
178. Though health care is not a right in the generic sense of the term "right," so-called
"Patients' Bill of Rights" legislation has been introduced that would purportedly guarantee
consumers explicit rights with regard to health care. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong.
(2003) (proposing a constitutional amendment to provide that all citizens have the right to
health care of "equal high quality"); H.R. 2315, 107th Cong. (2001) (seeking to protect
patient-provider interactions, access to obstetrics and gynecological care, and access to
pediatric care from interference by managed health care bureaucrats); S. 6, 107th Cong.
(2001) (seeking to improve access to specialist care; seeking to protect the physician-patient
relationship from interference by managed health care executives; and seeking to improve
access to appeals when care is denied by the managed care organization).
179. See supra Section I for a discussion of the origins of EMTALA.
180. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501 (1999).
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September 11, there are new priorities that require funding; for example, the
Food and Drug Administration has claimed that it needs additional funds to
8
ensure that food remains protected from terrorist acts. ' '
Hospital officials must continue to use their trade associations to lobby
for funds to improve their capabilities at addressing the threat of
bioterrorism. For instance, recent legislation appropriated $135 million for
"grants to improve hospital capacity to respond to bioterrorism."'' 82
In
addition, hospital officials must find creative ways of securing funding for
their facilities. For example, hospitals may need to raise more funds
through philanthropic programs, as some New York hospitals are doing. 83
The federal government realizes that various sectors of the economy
have financial needs that must be addressed and is determining how it will
address those needs in the face of diminished resources. One means by
which the federal government recently proposed to alleviate some of the
financial constraints of providers came in the form of a proposal to decrease
health care-related regulation. 8 4 These proposals, however, could have
disastrous consequences. Though providers would be granted relief from
extensive paperwork and from frequent surveys by state and federal
investigators, the effort would harm the public, as state and federal
compliance oversight would be diminished. Because the public is not fully
knowledgeable about its statutory health care rights, citizens are at a
disadvantage relative to providers. The intent of EMTALA was to protect
the public, and such proposals for deregulation must not impact EMTALA
enforcement. This would be contrary to the legislative intent of the statute.
C. The Needfor ContinuousAssessment ofProgress
Although concerns over patient dumping were voiced when Congress
drafted EMTALA there was little data on the scope of the problem.' 8 5 To
181. Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs Subcomm. on Oversight of
Gov't Mgmt., Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, 107th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2001)
(statement of Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Acting Principal Deputy Comm'r, FDA),
availableat http://www.fda.gov/ola/2001/foodsafetyl01o.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
182. Dep't of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from
and Response to Terrorists Attacks on the U.S. Act, Division A - Dep't of Defense
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230, 2314 (2002).
183. Cinda Becker, Hanging on: NYC Hospitals Begin to Recoup Losses, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 26, 2001, at 24 (finding that one New York area system reported $12
million in losses associated with the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, even though the system expected
to raise greater than average charitable donations).
184. Jonathan Gardner & Mark Taylor, Relief on a Shoestring; Amid Fiscal Pressure,
Feds Look at Medicare Deregulation as Way to Help Providers, MODERN HEALTHCARE,

Nov. 12, 2001, at4.
185. H.R. REP. 99-241, pt. 3, at 6 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 727-8 ("There
was little evidence available to the Committee during its consideration of H.R. 3128 as to the
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remedy this, the legislative history of the statute indicates that the General
Accounting Office was to:
[T]horoughly review the issue [of patient dumping]... [to] give
Congress sufficient information to objectively assess this problem.
Whatever additional steps General Accounting Office recommends,
whether further Medicare action or refinements in Medicaid, the aim of
the Congress should be to encourage states to take definite action to
186
guard against "dumping" at the local level ....
Despite Congressional recommendations that the General Accounting
these studies, there were no GAO studies until relatively
Office perform
87
recently.1
These studies are important because they highlight problems that exist
with EMTALA's structure. For example, the problem of improper motives
for transfers between emergency departments came to the attention of
legislators as a result of several scientific studies in the 1980's that
documented the magnitude of the problem. 18 8 The EMTALA statute,
however, has been in place for more than fifteen years and additional
studies are needed. While the OIG has documented trends in EMTALA
enforcement and has surveyed providers about their comfort level with the
statute, additional investigations by health services researchers, trade
associations, provider groups, and other stakeholders are essential in
understanding the effectiveness of the statute. Continuous assessment is
key to understanding how EMTALA affects the industry and the public.
While the reports of the OIG are instructive in ascertaining the
effectiveness of the statute, there are several drawbacks to leaving this
responsibility solely to governmental investigators. For example, providers
may not be as candid with their remarks as they would be with a nongovernmental health services researcher. Providers have an incentive to
spin the data that they furnish to government officials to serve their own
interests and insulate themselves against possible civil or criminal liability.
If the OIG developed a partnership with a not-for-profit think tank or
similar organization, the level of candor may be increased, as the partner
agency could presumably survey providers. 189 With any means the
scope of the problem addressed.., since there have been no hearings in either the House or
the Senate on this issue or on the language recommended by the Ways and Means
Committee.").
186. 131 CONG. REC. S13892 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
187. EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 52.
188. See Kellermann & Hackman, supra note 34, at 1288. See also Schiff et al., supra
note 26, at 495.
189. One possible not-for-profit investigative group that could be used is the RAND
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government uses, systems should be developed to monitor the progress of
hospitals in complying with the statute. There is evidence, for example,
that there are several "repeat violators" of EMTALA, 190 having been found
to be in noncompliance with the statute during two consecutive periods. If
systems were improved, more appropriate action could be taken to make
certain that repeat violations do not occur.
VII. CONCLUSION
For EMTALA to work as intended, three things must occur: (1)
appropriate financial relief must be made available to providers; (2) the
government must refine its procedures for holding providers accountable
for violations of EMTALA; and (3) governmental information systems
must be upgraded so that continuous assessment of the effectiveness of the
statute can be achieved.
To ensure that hospitals remain able to comply with EMTALA and
remain financially viable, the government must provide appropriate
financial relief to providers, including clarification on their responsibilities
under the statute as well as financial relief. Investigations by both the OIG
and CMS demonstrate that many providers who violate EMTALA do not
intend to do so. Instead, many ambiguous areas within the statute are
subject to multiple interpretations. Thus, the OIG and CMS must continue
to provide appropriate guidance to providers to ensure that providers are
penalized fairly in accordance with the statute. Additionally, the Balanced
Budget Act and other legislative initiatives have drastically decreased
Medicare funding for health care providers and Congress must continue to
improve funding for health care providers.
The legislative history of EMTALA suggests that Congress decided, as a
matter of public policy, that all persons had the right to receive emergency
medical care without regard to socioeconomic circumstance. Congress'
intent is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the governmental agencies charged
with enforcement of the statute must continue to be vigilant in enforcing the
letter of the law. As discussed, the OIG's prosecutorial discretion in
organization and its health care component, RAND HEALTH, which distributes health care
related books, briefings and conference proceedings. See RAND INST., A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
SELECTED
RAND
PUBLICATION
HEALTH-RELATED
RESEARCH,
available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/bib/SB4027.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
190. KAIJA BLALOCK & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP,
QUESTIONABLE HOSPITALS: 527 HOSPITALS THAT VIOLATED THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL
TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT: A DETAILED LOOK AT "PATIENT DUMPING" (July 2001)

(publishing a report on EMTALA enforcement, which found 527 hospitals with EMTALA
violations between 1996 and 2000, 12.9% of which were repeat violators that had recorded
EMTALA

violations

in

other

periods),

available

at

http://www.citizen.org/

questionablehospitals/qhcompletereport.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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imposing civil monetary penalties against providers has been exercised in a
haphazard manner.' 91 By holding the OIG responsible for enforcing the
letter of the law, the OIG's inconsistent use of prosecutorial discretion
could be eliminated or drastically reduced. Literal enforcement of the
penalties provided in EMTALA will ensure that the statute remains
consequential enough to compel compliance on the part of providers. Until
Congress decides that public policy no longer demands that all persons have
a right to emergency care, providers must continue to provide emergency
care to all who present to the emergency department, despite the harsh
economic environment that providers currently face.
Finally, Congress must refine the means of data collection on EMTALA.
An agency or not-for-profit organization should be appointed to provide
regular reports to Congress on the state of EMTALA. These reports should
be given annually so that year-to-year comparisons can be made to establish
data on the effectiveness of the statute. The regular reports provided to
Congress should include input from essential stakeholders. Thus, hospital
administrators, emergency department physicians, CMS, and DHHS
personnel should all be involved in workgroups designed to provide the
government with information on the effectiveness of EMTALA.
Though hospital administrators face economic constraints due to cuts in
Medicare reimbursement, the mandate of EMTALA remains clear and
Providers simply must ensure that all persons receive
unchanged.
emergency care without regard to their ability to pay. Hospitals' claims of
financial hardship warrant heightened federal financial assistance, but
cannot be used as an excuse for noncompliance with EMTALA.

VIII. POSTSCRIPT: NEW EMTALA REGULATIONS
The CMS issued new EMTALA regulations that were published in the
Federal Register on September 9, 2003, and are effective November 10,
2003.192 Though a comprehensive review of the new regulations is beyond
the scope of this narrative, the newly available guidance will be briefly
addressed.
The new regulations represent yet another attempt by the government to
clarify the responsibilities of providers under EMTALA, addressing
93
For
situations in which EMTALA obligations arise for hospitals.
term
example, the revised regulations create new terminology, including the
191. See supra Section III for discussion of prosecutorial discretion.
192. Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating
Hospitals in Treating Individuals With Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222
(Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482 and 489).
193. Id.
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"dedicated emergency department" to indicate when an EMTALA
194
obligation will arise for a hospital provider.
The new regulations also incorporate a "prudent layperson" standard;
however, the standard is used to determine whether EMTALA obligations
arise as a result of a patient having come to the emergency department.
Thus, a patient "comes to the emergency department" when, inter alia, "a
prudent layperson observer would believe, based on the individual's
appearance or behavior, that the individual needs examination or treatment
for a medical condition. 195
Though the new regulations do provide additional guidance to providers
as to the scope of their EMTALA obligations, many questions remain
unanswered.
For example, the post-stabilization responsibilities of
hospitals with regard to Medicare+Choice enrollees have not been fully
delineated.196 In addition, there is some confusion as to what sampling
techniques should be used to determine whether a hospital operates a
"dedicated emergency department."'1 97 Accordingly, CMS has indicated
that it will issue additional guidance so that providers may achieve a better
understanding of their obligations under EMTALA.
Notwithstanding the additional clarification provided by the revised
regulations, the regulations do not address most of the commentary
provided in this narrative. Crucial issues such as funding for EMTALA and
the increased demand on emergency departments for services still remain,
and should be addressed by both CMS and DHHS.' 98

194. Id. at 53,263.
195. Id. at 53,262.
196. Id. at 53,225 (stating that CMS will address this issue in future policy guidance).
197. Id. at 53,229 (stating that CMS "may develop a series of questions and answers for
posting on [its] website that will provide further clarification and guidance to providers").
198. Since the completion of this article, Congress has also passed the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
108th Cong. (2003). Here again, the specifics of the legislation are beyond the scope of this
article. Note, however, that the legislation does incorporate another suggestion that the
author has made in this article. The statute amends EMTALA to require the Secretary of
DHHS to establish a process by which he will notify providers when an EMTALA
investigation has been closed. The legislation also establishes a Technical Advisory Group
to review issues related to EMTALA and its implementation. The Advisory Group is
comprised of various industry stakeholders, including hospitals, physicians, patient
representatives, and regional office personnel who are involved with the oversight of
EMTALA investigations.
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